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Some Guidelines for Efficiency-Oriented Design 
by 
ARNOLD PICOT and BIRGITTA WOLFF * 
The German public sector is confronted with drastically increasing household 
deficits. Yet, a coherent concept of reorganizing public enterprises and admin- 
istrations does not seem to be being applied, At the same time, economic models 
often appear too abstract or too complicated to be applied by practicioners. 
Some general guidelines must therefore be developed that are in line with 
economic reasoning and that can offer orientation for concrete applications. In 
this article, we develop such a set of rules which is derived from the New 
Institutional Economics. (JEL: H 40, M21, D 23) 
l. Introduction 
Competitive forces in the public sector are less intensive than in the private 
sector. Thus the need to develop efficiency-oriented reasoning has not been 
forced to develop as urgently. There are, however, several determinants that 
substitute for explicit classical market competition, e.g. scarcity of public funds, 
interregional and international competition of locations. Such forces call for 
efficiency arguments and design even in the public sector. Yet the reorganiza- 
tion of the German public sector is not based upon a coherent strategy or 
concept. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop pragmatic adaptions of three branch- 
es of the New Institutional Economics to organizational problems in the public 
domain. Finally, a systematic, theory-based approach to organizational design 
of public firms and administrations will be suggested. It is not the subject of this 
paper to actually apply formal neo-institutional models to individual practical 
problems, but rather to offer some general guidelines to those such as officials 
dealing with these problems. 
The theoretical models we refer to have mainly been developed for use in 
private sector organizations. In transferring these models to public sector orga- 
* This paper is based on an earlier contribution of the authors (PICOT and WOLFF 
[1992]). Support of Bertelsmann Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 
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nizations, we are following the conviction that the assumptions as to human 
behavior and rationality, which are the basis of these models, are valid in public 
as well as in private sector contexts. Crucial characteristics of human behavior 
are individual tltiliry maximizatioiz and opportunism.' The notion of rationality 
which is implied in our approach is the conception of "bounded rationality" as 
described by SIMON [l9931 and WILLIAMSON [1974]. It refers to the limited 
capability of individuals to have information about all alternatives and conse- 
quences, to process that information, and to communicate within the limits of 
language. 
Another presupposition of our analysis is that the objectives of public sector 
organizations are externally given. We are aware of the fact that this is only 
partly true,' but in our context, the interdependencies between means and ends 
can be neglected to the same degree as they are being neglected in private 
seclor organizations. The aims of public firms and administrations will be 
assumed to be given from the politicaI process, which will not be analyzed in 
this paper. Yet our theoretical framework is, to a large degree, consistent with 
important assumptions and results of the public choice approach, especially 
with the requirements of methodological individualism. The state is supposed to 
have two types of functions, those of a protective state but also the functions 
of a productive  fate.^ Therefore, almost everything can be a public goal, 
provided that there is some general consensus about it. 
It is our objective to "translate" abstract economic theory into practical 
management tools.4 These theory-based tools, which have already been applied 
to practical consulting projects in the private sector, might thus be valuable 
instruments to increase the efficiency of public sector organizations. The ap- 
proach presented below is normative in so far as it uses positive arguments for 
actually shaping practical organizations. 
In both the private and the public sector, problems of delegation and coor- 
dination are caused by a division of labor that goes along with a scarcity of 
resources in relation to desired outputs. If the problems as well as the charac- 
teristics of the individuals and resources involved are similar, it should be 
possible to transfer an organizational framework which has been successfully 
used to reduce organizational problems in private sector firms to public sector 
organizations as welL5 
In section 2 we will present an outlme of our theoretical framework. Some 
applications to practical organizational problems of public sector organizations 
will be discussed in section 3. In the same section, an implementation scheme 
will be proposed. The last section comprises some concluding remarks. 
l See also FURUROTN and RICHTER [1991,4-51. 
See LANE 1992, 74-76, 167, 210-2111 and HOMANN [1980]. 
See BUCHANAN 119751. 
See also PICOT [1990]. 
See also MOE 11984, 758-7431, BUDAUS [1988], and ENGELHARDT [1992, 84-87]. 
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2. A Theoretical Framework for Organizational Problems in the Public Sector 
The prevailing division of labor between the private and the public sector of 
national economies has historically evolved. Many reasons other than econom- 
ic efficiency have influenced the development and expansion of public firms and 
administrations. Economic efficiency is defined as the desired output at the 
lowest possible input of resources. Therefore, what we are seeking is a way to 
organize the production of politically desired outputs that is not only effective, 
but at the same time most efficient compared to alternative forms of organiza- 
tion. 
There is no economic reason why all politically desired outputs should auto- 
matically be produced by public organizations or civil servants - ,even if those 
goods and services are demanded and paid for by the state.6 From an economic 
point of view, public firms and administrations are simply one organizational 
form of producing politically desired outputs, and compete with alternative 
forms of organization. This is illustrated by table 1. In Germany, there exists 
the following range of possibilities for rendering individually or collectively 
those goods and services: 
- civil servants or officials (Beamte) in public administrations, 
- ordinary employees or clerks (Angestellte) in public administrations, 
- public employees in other public organizations, e.g. firms (such as public 
transportation or public savings banks) or "Sondervermogen" (social securi- 
ty etc.), 
- all kinds of public and private non-profit-organizations, 
/ Public Task 1 
Public Service Associations Firms Private Individuals 
Hierarchy Market Table 1 
Alternative Arrangements by Which Goods are Produced and Paid for 
See also STIGLITZ [1989, 151. 
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- "private" firms with a high share of government ownership, e.g. Deutsche 
Lufthansa, 
- private firms with a low share of government ownership, but controlled by 
public supervisory authorities or politicians who are appointed to the super- 
visory boards of those companies, e.g. electric power-supply companies, 
such as RWE or VEW, 
- private firms which are dependent on government orders, e.g. local garbage 
disposal and cleaning companies,. 
- private firms whose production is regulated by public restraints, e.g. environ- 
mental or data protection laws, 
- private associations which are not recognized as non-profit-organizations, 
e.g. associations of certain professional groups, 
- independent private companies or individuals. 
The question then is: Which politically desired outputs should be produced 
in public firms and administrations, and which can be more efficiently pro- 
duced in a different way? Given a certain politically desired program, the first 
step in our analysis is to find criteria to decide which form of organization has 
to be chosen for the production of which kind of goods and services. 
This problem bears a strong resemblance to the procurement decisions of 
private firms. As far as practical problems of vertical integration or desintegra- 
tion in private companies are concerned, the transaction costs approach is 
broadly acknowleclged to offer useful criteria. These will be transferred to 
functions of the public sector in the subsequent section. 
2.1' Transaction Costs Approach 
In line with transaction costs t h e ~ r y , ~  our argument is that in the public as well 
as in the private sector, the allocation of tasks to different organizational forms 
should be based on an analysis of the characteristics of the good and services 
which have to be produced. After this classification has been made, the tasks 
can be allocated to the appropriate producer.' Due to a better use of economies 
of scale, a reduction of organizational slack, and the competitive forces of 
private markets, this method not only ensures a reduction of transaction costs 
but of overall. production costs and an increase in adaptability to new demands 
and new frameworks as well.' 
The difference between our procedure and the prevailing procurement policy 
of government institutions is that, at this stage, we ignore traditional, legal, 
interest-group and other constraints. At first, we develop a purely economic 
framework of how a certain good or service could be most efficiently produced. 
' See WILLIAMSON 119901. 
See PICOT /l991 a] and R R ~ N  [1990, 3-22]. 
This has been discussed in greater detail in PICOT and WOLFF [1992]. 
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Afterwards, political and other constraints can then also be considered. Follow- 
ing this method and supporting it by an adequate system of public account- 
ing,'' we will be able to point out the "costs" of considering non-economic 
arguments, so that the taxpayer, i.e. the voter, can decide if she or he is prepared 
to bear those costs. The procedure currently prevailing is completely nontrans- 
parent to the public because the allocation of public resources does not follow 
publicly discussed rules of efficiency, but nontransparent contingencies of bar- 
gaining between interest groups and politicians. The procedure suggested below 
is therefore more in accordance with a democratic system than the present 
one." The traditional German public sector as described by Max WEBER [l9851 
has historically evolved to ensure an effective and "rational" fulfillment of 
orders in a hierarchically structured system. It is not designed to ensure the 
efficient fulfillment of democratic voters' needs and to justify public spend- 
ing." So it is only logical that the rules of public firms and administrations 
must be adjusted to new and changing requirements of democratic systems. 
The characteristics which we use to classify the goods and services demanded 
are specificity and strategic relevance. In order to support the analysis, uncer- 
tainty and frequency can be considered as well. 
a 
A production process is highly specific if the required inputs can either not 
be used at all for the production of alternative products, or only at high 
opportunity costs. From a practical point of view, specificity refers mainly to 
investments into the development of the design and quality of a product, 
human capital, machines and logistics. The fewer the alternative uses of an 
input resource, the higher the specificity of that resource. 
Strategic relevance refers to requirements which result from the competitive 
situation in particular markets, e.g. the observance of secrecy. Strategic rele- 
vance may, in the case of private firms, correlate with specificity, since specific 
investments are useless if they do not help to improve market positions. In the 
case of public firms and administrations, however, it is more likely that secrecy 
of data must be observed because individual rights or "national interests" are 
concerned. Whenever constitutional elements of a state are affected, the neglect 
of which might cause instant and irreversible damage to members of the com- 
munity or to the entire state, a production process bears high strategic rele- 
vance. It  is obvious that in this respect, even services requiring only (technically) 
unspecific inputs can be of a high strategic relevance to state, e.g. the travel 
arrangements for the German Chancellor. To take him from Bonn to Berlin is 
not a specific task. But the requirements of his protection might demand a 
special organization of his journey, e.g. by an air force plane. Therefore, the 
distinction between specificity and strategic relevance seems to be useful in 
analyzing "public" tasks. 
'O See also section 3.2 of this paper. 
" For an in-depth discussion of the relation between organizational rationality and 
democracy, see HOMANN [1988, 133-1771. 
See BECKER [1992,141-1511. 
216 Arinold Picot and Birgitta WoSff ~ T E  
Thus we can deduct from transaction costs-analysis that the following prin- 
ciple should be observed: Goods and services that bear a high specificity and 
high strategic relevance demand a high degree of vertical integration, whereas 
goods and services with a low degree of specificity and strategic relevance can 
be easily outsourced.13 
The degree of vertical integration of public tasks varies between the extremes 
of a total vertical integration ("make", i.e. hierarchy) and a total disintegration 
("buy", i.e. market). The "make" decision of a state means that a good or 
service must be produced exclusively by public servants working in the public 
domain, e.g. police services. The "buy" decision means that a good or a service 
must be purchased externally, e.g.  a pencil for the German Chancellor's secre- 
tary can be bought in an ordinary private stationery shop. 
In between these two extremes. we find at least two major alternatives. One 
important form of organization existing between civil service and private com- 
panies is cooperation between different kinds of public and private organiza- 
tions (privatelpublic partnership). The quality and intensity of that cooperation 
can be specified by different contractual agreements ranging from classical to 
relational contracts.'" In addition, the state may also use its right to control 
private organizations by law aitdregulation without actively participating in the 
production pro~ess . '~  
4 
Strategic Relevance of Output 
Specificity 
of 
Input 
IOW 
Table 2 
Choice of the Appropriate Form of Organization 
low high 
Market 
l' See also PICOT [l991 R ,  3461. 
l" See MACNBIL 119741 and 119781. 
l 5  See GOLDRERG [l9761 and KLEIN, CRAWFORD and ALCHIAN [1978, 3021. 
Regulation/ 
Law 
b 
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Hence there are four basic alternative forms of organizations for the produc- 
tion of politically desired goods and services that can be matched with specifici- 
ty and strategic relevance. 
As a result of the first step of our argument and in accordance with transac- 
tion cost theory, we can conclude: 
- Unspecific tasks with low strategic relevance should be purchased from 
external partners in ordinary markets, e.g. stationery for public offices or 
cleaning and gardening services for public buildings. 
- For specific tasks with a low strategic relevance, e.g. public road planning 
and construction, we suggest a cooperation between public organization and 
specialized private suppliers. 
- Highly specific tasks which are at the same time of high strategic relevance 
can efficiently be done by specialized public organizations, e.g. services in the 
fields of internal and external public security or jurisdiction. 
- The accomplishment of unspecific but strategically relevant tasks can be 
assured by means of regulation, e.g. limits to exhaust emission or compulso- 
ry education. 
We have so far avoided the problem of measuring transaction costs. Yet there 
is no need to measure them in order to find adequate organizational solutions. 
In this context, the only function that transaction costs have is that of providing 
for an intellectual link between categories of tasks and forms of organization 
in order to explain why certain goods or services require certain forms of 
procurement. Once an agreement on the classification of tasks is reached - e.g. 
on the basis of elaborate questionnaires and interviews l 6  -, there is hardly any 
need for discussion of the appropriate form of procurement. 
2.2 Property Rights 
Because of opportunistic and rational utility-maximizing behavior, individuals 
tend to cause external effects when dealing with resources which are allocated 
to third parties. If individuals do not have to bear the consequences of the way 
in which they deal with scarce resources, they have no direct incentive to use 
those resources efficiently. In property rights terms: The more completely the 
rights over resources are allocated to the acting individual, the stronger @re the 
incentives to use and preserve those resources efficiently. 
"Property rights assignments specify the norms of behavior with respect to 
things that each and every person must observe in his interactions with other 
persons, or bear the cost for nonobservance" (FURUBOTN and PEJOVICH [1972, 
11391). There is an entire bundle of rights relevant to the economic theory of 
organization." These rights can be summarized in three categories: 
l 6  See also section 3.3 of this paper. 
" See ALCHIAN and DEMSETZ [1972, 7831. 
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a) the right to control a firm, 
b) the right to be a residual claimant, and 
c) the right to sell all rights that the ownership of a firm brings about. 
Following Furubotn and Pejovich, we can say that, by the allocation of prop- 
erty rights, individual decisions are influenced and indirectly controlled: The 
allocation of property rights defines the constitution of organizations. This is 
illustrated in table 3. There is historical evidence that some types of firms have 
been more successful than others, e.g. state-owner or worker-managed firms do 
Table 3 
Allocation of Property Rights in Different Types of Firms 
with statutory 
codeterrnination 
Corporation 
with voluntary 
codetermination 
Worker-mana- 
ged firm (e.g. in 
ex-Yugoslavia) 
Non-profit- 
organization 
State-owned 
firm 
Public 
administration 
Employees 
Employees 
Workers/ 
Management 
Members, resp. 
Politicians (State) 
Politicians 
(State)/ 
Management 
Politicians 
(State)/Public 
Servants 
Shareholders 
Shareholders 
Workers 
State 
- 
Shareholders 
Shareholders 
- 
- 
State 
- 
unlimitedly 
transferable 
non 
transferable 
limitedly 
transferable 
limitedly 
transferable 
non 
transerable 
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not seem to have the same economic success as manager- or ownerled compa- 
nies.'* a 
The category "right to control" the firm comprises many different rights to 
make decisions and give  instruction^.'^ These can be allocated individually. In 
addition, there are substitutes for personal ownership, such as performance-re- 
lated pay, competition, or corporate culture, which can also be used as mech- 
anisms to reinforce an individual responsibility for decisionmakers. So there is 
a whole set of different combinations that define different types of organiza- 
tion. The different allocations of property rights, say, in an industrial holding 
or profit center organization and in a classical public bureaucracy allow for 
completely different incentive-structures. Generally speaking, an allocation of 
property rights which internalizes a maximum of effects to the acting individu- 
als will allow for the most efficient production process, compared with alterna- 
tive settings. 
In public enterprises and administrations, however, many of the organiza- 
tional options are not available. Since property rights in state-owned firms and 
administrations are hardly transferable, options such as equity participation of 
managers and workers cannot be implemented. Incentive pay systems, e.g. in 
the form of profit participation, are difficult to introduce if performance cannot 
be measured." In addition to this, there is hardly any competitive pressure on 
public firms because their selling is granted by the public owner while theiz 
funding is granted by the tax payer. At the same time, civil servants and public 
employees are comparatively free of competitive pressure because their special 
legal status offers almost absolute job security and relatively safe career 
paths." 
The definition and allocation of property rights or substitute mechanisms 
incurs transaction costs. These must be considered when deciding on the orga- 
nizational design of a firm. Therefore, there is a close relation between transac- 
tion costs implications as described in the previous section and property rights. 
In order to secure a maximum of adaptability to environmental changes, e.g. 
new market requirements, it is important to choose an allocation of property 
rights which allows for organizational changes by easily transferable property 
rights. For changing tasks, it is useful to choose an allocation of rights which 
can be changed at low transaction costs. In this respect, publicly owned firms 
and government administrations have major disadvantages. Alternative set- 
tings are described by the column "Transferability of Property Rights" in 
table 3. 
For this section, we can conclude: For an efficient procurement of politically 
desiredgoods or services, resources should be allocated to that organization which 
is defined by a transaction costs-minimizing allocation of property rights. 
See for example PICOT and KAULMANN 11985, 967-9781. 
l9 See ALCHIAN and DEMSETZ 11972, 7831. 
20 See also section 3.2. 
See also section 3.1. 
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2.3 Agency Problerns 
In addition to the transaction costs- and property rights-approaches, we will 
now introduce risk aversion of individuals and inforination asymmetries. For a 
simplification of the following argument let us assume that, in general, agents 
are more risk averse than the principals. For reasons which will be explained 
below, this seems to be even more true in the German public service than, for 
instance, in the American public service. In order to develop further principles 
of how organizations have to be structured for an efficient production of goods 
and services, we will therefore concentrate on the problem of information 
asymmetry. 
If person P (principal) puts person A (agent) in charge of pursuing a certain 
goal an his behalf, an agency-relationship is established. This means that P 
allocates resources to A, and A's decisions also affect P's utility. Wherever 
division of labor or a delegation of tasks appear, asymmetric information is 
likely to arise.22 This means that P may lack environmental information, or 
information on A's qualification, efforts or intentions, or a combination of 
both. In any case, there is scope for opportunistic actions on the part of the 
agent A. This is very likely to happen if A's interests differ from P's, so there 
is a conflict of interests. This is called the agency problem. 
Table 4 shows three types of asymmetric information: hidden clzaracteristics, 
hidd~n actionllzidden ir$orination, and hidden i n t e r ~ f i o n . ~ ~  
In the case of Iriddeiz clzaracteristics, the principal lacks information as to the 
actual quality of the goods or services which are offered by the agent. The 
reason for this problem is that the principal cannot monitor and verify all 
charac~eristics of the agent's offer. So there is the possibility of opportunistic 
behavior by the agent even before the contractual agreement. The principal 
must bear the risk of an adverse selection of his contractual partner.24 This is 
an essential threat to the principal's utility especially when she or he is tied to 
a specific agent by a long-term contract, such as life-time-labor contracts in the 
German public service. In addition to this, there is a dynamic aspect: The 
agent's characteristics might change in relation to his environment, even if the 
agent himself does not change, but if her or his environment or the task does. 
In the case of hidden action or hidden infornzation, the principal is unable to 
monitor or to assess the efforts of the agent after the contractual agreement has 
been established. This causes the risk of inoral hazard, which becomes worse as 
the fungability or "plasticity" or resources and the monitoring costs rise.25 The 
greater the number of uses to which a cerlain resource may be put, the higher 
is its plasticity. In public administrations, the main inputs are human capital, 
" See also EISENHARDT [l 9891 and SPREMANN [1990]. 
23 See SPREMANN E1990, 565-5721 and DIETL [1993, 131-1521. 
" See also MOE 11984, 754-7561. 
ALCHIAN and WOODWARD [1991], 132-1341. 
Types of Information Asymmetry and Ways of Reducing Them 
Hidden Characteristics Hidden Action/ Hidden Information 
Agent's effort 
not assessable 
plasticityy 
monitoring costs 
After contractual 
agreement 
Stockholder (P) and 
CEO (A); performance 
in public service 
Moral Hazard 
Coalignment of interests 
Profit participation 
of agent 
Equity participation, 
incentive pay system, 
bonuses 
Principal's 
Information 
Problem 
Cause of, resp. 
Main Influence 
on the Problem 
Agent's Scope 
of Action 
Example 
Type of Risk 
Method of 
Problem Solving 
Methods of 
Risk Limitation 
(Examples) 
Practical Examples 
Hidden Intention 
Agent's intention after 
contract. Agreement 
unknown 
Dependency on, 
uniqueness and deprivabi- 
lity of resources 
After contractual 
agreement 
Fishermen (P) and 
Cannery (A); strike of 
public service 
Hold Up 
Coalignment of interests 
Vertical intergration 
hostages 
Acquisition of cannery 
by fishermen; contrac- 
tual penalties; 
"Beamtenschaft" 
Quality of contract-partner's offer 
unknown 
Possibility to hide characteristics 
Before contractual agreement 
Insurance Company (Principal) and Client 
(Agent); Employment of personnel 
Adverse Selection . 
Coalignment of 
interests 
Reputation of 
contract partner 
Lavvyer 
Reduction of information 
asymmetry by 
Signalling/ 
Screening 
Balance-sheets, 
references, 
certificates 
University 
Degree 
Self selection 
Refined 
agreements 
Insurance 
conditions, 
German BAT 
and Beamtenrecht 
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office equipment and money. All of these are fungible. At the same time, there 
is a large amount of moral hazard losses in large bureaucratic organizations, 
such as public firms and administrations, because ownership (tax payers) and 
control are completely separated, and there are long paths of hierarchy and 
delegation. There are also utility losses if, due to expert knowledge, senior 
employees cannot assess the jobs of subordinate employees. This might, for 
example, be the case with research institutes which are supposed to be con- 
trolled by a minister who may not be experienced in that particular field of 
science. The plasticity of resources and monitoring costs tend to be rather high 
in public firms and administrations. 
In the case of hidden intention, there is a dependency of the principal on the 
resources which the agent contributes to the production process. The principal 
depends on a continuation of the agency relationship due to specific invest- 
ments and lack of alternatives. This type of risk is called hold From 
transaction costs point of view, this is the situation of ex post-specificity 
after the fundamental t ransformat i~n .~~ Even if it is possible to monitor the 
agent's effort and all external factors, the principal does not have the means to 
change the situation. A brief example can illustrate the hold up problem: In 
1992. there was a strike by large sections of the German public service. The 
public garbage disposal system in Munich was involved as well. There was no 
alternative way of getting the garbage removed. It is easy to imagine what this 
meant to the population of Munich and for the bargaining position of the trade 
union. 
In general, there are two ways of limiting the principal's disadvantages, either 
by a reduction of the information asymmetry, or by a coalignment of interests 
between principal and agent. A red~tction of the information asymmetry can be 
facilitated by signalling, screening of self selection. In table 4, examples are also 
given of how a coalignment of interests can be secured in practice. 
Public administrations and firms bring about all kinds of information asym- 
rnetries between principal and agents. This refers to taxpayer-politician rela- 
tionqhips as well as to agency relationships inside public firms and adminis- 
trations. Due to the specific constellation of property rights, which is illus- 
trated in table 3. agency problems may be even worse than in privately owned 
firms. Thus it is even more important that all methods of risk limitation are 
used when shaping public organizations. For now, we can conclude: Signal- 
ling, screening, selfsekction, and all contractual nzethods to coalign the interests 
of principal and agent should be used also iiz public firms and administrations if 
they het) to reduce the costs oJ opportunistic behavior and waste of public re- 
sources. 
" See GOLDBERG 11976,4391 and ALCHIAN and WOODWARD 11991, 130- 1321 
27 See WILLIA~ISON [1990, 70-721. 
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3. Some Applications to Public Firms and Administrations 
Now that we have derived some general guidelines to restrain efficiency losses 
in public firms and administration from three types of institutional analysis, we 
will proceed to further illustrate their application. First, the special status of 
employees in the German public service will be analyzed. Then, we will point 
out the effects of an improved system of public accounting. At the end of this 
section, we will outline a way in which the implementation of organizational 
improvements in public firms and administrations could actually be realized. 
3.1 The Special Status of Public Employees 
Let us assume the "state", i.e. the politicians who are acting as agents for the 
voters, has to procure goods or services which are highly specific and strategi- 
cally relevant. From table 2 we can deduce that the recommended form of 
organization should be characterized by a high degree of vertical integration. 
A total vertical integration demands the acquisition of all specific input re- 
sources. In public administrations, however, as in many private businesses, the 
most important type of input is human capital. Since the abolition of slavery, 
however, a total vertical integration of human capital is impossible. 
Instead, the employer seems to secure the protection of his specific invest- 
ments by labor contracts. As explained in section 2.1, the state not only has the 
right to enter into ordinary, legal contracts, but, in addition to the legal possi- 
bilities which are accessible to all individuals, it also has the right to protect its 
interests by law and reg~lation.'~ It is exactly this right that the German state 
is using when granting a special legal status to its public employees. In 1991, 
there were about 6.7million public employees in Germany (out of about 
80 million inhabitants). More than 2.1 million of them were employed by the 
16 German federal states, about 1.6 million by municipal authorities, 532,200 
by the Bundespost, 462,000 by the German railways, 300,000 by the social 
security-administrations and similar organizations, and about 628,800 by the 
federal government, including the members of the German army.29 At first 
sight, it must be doubted whether this large public workforce is really necessary 
in order to fulfil1 nothing but specific and strategically important tasks of the 
state. Thus, there is a potential for privatization. This is being increasingly 
realized and explored, for example in the case of Telekom and the German 
railways, with both seeming to be on their way to privatization. However, it 
seems interesting to analyze whether special characteristics of public tasks offer 
sufficient economic justification for special regulations of public service labor 
contracts. 
See table 2. 
See INSTITUT DER DEUTSCHEN WIRTSCHAFT [1993, Table 821 and LAU [1992, 191. 
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About one third of these public employees are "Beamte". The main effect of 
the "Beamtenrecht" is that they are granted a life-time-employment and an 
outstanding pension system. The state guarantees a system of promotions and 
lifelong payments to them which is somewhat independent of their actual 
perf~rmance.~' In return, German "Beamte" are expected to serve their em- 
ployers with a special degree of loyalty and reliability. For example, they are 
not allowed to strike. The "Beamten" are said to have a characteristic sense of 
duty or even a special "ethos."31 
From the point of view of an economic theorist, it seems hard to believe, that 
any employee should not behave in a utility maximizing and opportunistic way 
according to her or his individual  preference^.^^ There is evidence that there is 
individual utility maximization also in the public sector.33 Our approach sug- 
gests that special patterns of behavior that might appear in the public service 
result from the special conditions of their labor contract. From an agency point 
of view, the German "Beamtenrecht" causes a bundle of effects: 34 
1. Seif,relection. The Beamten-status offers a high degree ofjob- and income-se- 
curity. This is particularly attractive to comparatively risk-averse employees. 
Depending on their personality, they might, in return, be prepared to develop 
a special sense of duty. 
2. A coalignment of interests. Since not only the employer but also the em- 
ployees have specific investments into a long-term relation of this kind, the 
"Beamtenrecht" offers hostcrges to both parties. Under normal conditions, a 
public employer cannot dismiss "Beamte." This way, specific investments on 
the side of the employee are protected and encouraged. A special kind of 
protection may be necessary in order to secure a sufficient amount of human 
capital for the production of services which are not only strategically important 
but also highly ~pecific.~' 
In principle, the "Beamtenrecht" offers useful instruments to reduce prob- 
lems of adverse selection and hold up in public firms and administrations. So the 
general idea of the "Beamtenschaft" can be conceived to be justifiable even 
from an economic per~pect ive.~~ This does not mean that it should be used as 
the only instrument. The moral hazard-problems, however, are not yet solved 
unless we believe in a special Beamten-Ethos. In order to solve monitoring 
problems, we will suggest some more effective methods in section 3.2. 
30 For further details see BECKER [1989, 822-8251. 
31 See for example OETTLE 119801. 
32 See for example RUBIN [1990, 47-50]. 
33 This is supported by VON LOESCH [l9801 in a direct response to OETTLE [1980]. 
34 See table 4. 
See table 2. 
36 This is also reflected by the economic discussion on tenure, see ALCHIAN [1984,38], 
CARMICHAEL [l9881 and MILGROM and ROBERT~ 11992,380-3811. See also KLEIN, CRAW- 
FORD and ALCHIAN [1978,317]. 
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The result of our short positive analysis is a general appreciation of the 
special status of public employees. But, for reasons of efficiency, these special 
rights should be restricted to the very limited number of employees who actu- 
ally deal with specific and strategically important tasks. Our impression of the 
situation in German public firms and administrations is that the public employ- 
ers have failed to draw this distinction. There are many public employees doing 
jobs wich are in no way specific or strategically relevant to the state, e.g. 
gardening, cleaning, cooking, repairing cars, etc. For this kind of work, the 
costly employment of "Beamten" does not offer any advantages in comparison 
to alternative solutions and is, therefore, inefficient. The second issue concern- 
ing the German public service which economists cannot justify is why even 
those public employees who are not "Beamte" have almost the same rights, but 
not the same duties, as "Beamte." As opposed to "Beamte", they have, for 
example, the right to strike. This right was used in 1992 and caused an estimated 
cost of DM 310 million to the state and an additional DM 200 million to the 
private economy.37 On the other hand, all public employees have almost the 
same I g h  job-security as "Beamte." From an economic perspective, it is ratio- 
nal to grant extra rights to employees if in return they accept extra duties. This 
does not seem to be the case in all parts of the public service. One result is that 
the production of many public services, which should not be public, is too 
expensive. Another result is that the public service tends to be comparatively 
incapable of adapting to new demands and developments. If the special rights 
brought about by the "Beamtenrecht" are not allocated according to the rules 
which have been developed above, the outcome is bound to be inefficiency. In 
Germany, the definition and allocation of civil servants-rights must be revised. 
For this section, we can conclude: To grant special rights to public employees 
is efJicient, if and only if tasks are concerned which are at the same time highly 
specific and strategically important to the state. 
3.2 Transparency and Incentives by Information and Communication 
The problems of hidden action and hidden information present the worst threats 
to the efficiency of agency-relationships. Both can be the roots of moral-hazard 
problems. Especially in public administration, most of the resources which are 
used in production processes, such as human capital, telephones, computers, 
and ofice equipment, can also be used for many other purposes; hence there 
is a high degree of resource plasticity.38 At the same time, it is hardly possible 
to monitor the efforts of individual employees - even if we assume all external 
factors to be well-known and constant - since we do not or even cannot 
measure the output of many public production processes. As opposed to pri- 
vate firms, public firms and administrations have only recently begun to consid- 
er the introduction of accounting-systems which allow for information on the 
37 See IWD 11992, 71. 
38 See table 4. 
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inputs and outputs of certain production processes. The traditional "Kamera- 
list~k" was developed to secure effectiveness in the fulfillment of orders from 
monarchic rulers. It is completely inappropriate in a democracy, where the 
taxpayers insist not only on an effective but also on an efficient public service.39 
There must be a transparent system of accounting which generates precise 
information as to the costs and performance of production processes in public 
firnis and administrations. Otherwise, it will remain impossible to control the 
allocation of inputs in such a way as to avoid a waste of resources.40 
To economists this is self-evident and not even new. But when discussing the 
topic of accounting with practitioners in German public administrations, the 
possibility and the neccessity of a new public accounting system if often denied, 
because the function of public firms and administrations is not to achieve any 
financial profits but to fulfil1 political orders.41 This response reveals a misun- 
derstanding of the aim of accounting systems. No matter what kind of goal is 
to be accomplished, it is essential to have information on the costs and perfor- 
mance of the production system. Without this information, the voters have no 
possibility of verifying whether their mandate has been fulfilled. Without pub- 
licly available information on the performance of public firms and administra- 
tions, an efficient allcrcation of resources cannot be ensured. It is precisely the 
vague character of public interests that makes even more necessary the mecha- 
nism to secure their accomplishment. 
A public accounting and reporting system would offer information to the 
public as well as to the participants in "public" production processes them- 
selves. It would lead to a considerable reduction of agency costs within the 
public sector. The German taxpayer would become aware of the costs of some 
well-established public institutions and could evaluate their benefits and costs. 
This might keep the politicians from offering a lot of "benefits," which voters 
only ask for as long as they do not know the exact costs. In Switzerland, for 
example, there is no plebiscite without detailed information on the cost of the 
toplc concerned. 
The public system of accounting and reporting should be supported by 
means of modern information technology. Part of the new public information 
system should be a number of terminals which are accessible to the public. 
Thcse terminals could not only offer information in issues of interest. They 
could also offer standard services like registrations and collecting applications 
for official docunlents. There are many routine tasks which could be shifted 
away from public employees. In this respect, the authorities could learn a lot 
from the banking sector.42 
3" See LUDER [1987], 119891 and EICHHORN [1991]. 
See BUNDESRECHNUNGSHOF [l 9911, BUND DER STEUERZAHLER [l 9871, STREIM [l 9871 
and SIMON 11993, 103-1 161. 
See also LANDERER and ROHRICHT [1991, 85-87]. 
See STAUDT 119901, ZITZELSBERGER /1992], SMITH and ?VIELD 119911, and KEEN 
[1991, 36-38]. 
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In addition to the fields which are discussed above, economic tools can also 
be used for decisions on performance-related pay schemes,43 the optimal degree 
of de~entralization~~ or the implementation of ~ o r k ~ r o u ~ s . ~ ~  A wide range of 
organizational problems can be analysed and solved by the set of principles 
which we have presented and used above.46 
3.3 Implementation 
In this section, we will describe how a specific organizational problem can be 
dealt with in practice. We will give an outline of how new patterns of organiza- 
tion can be found and implemented for a specific task. 
Let us assume the authorities of Munich had to assess security at the local 
subway system. The question is: Which is the most efficient way to guarantee 
the security of subway passengers? Let us assume that until now, Munich has 
had 250 guards who are employed by the city of Munich. Only the senior 
officers are "Beamte." Imagine there are three competing private security 
companies, which would be able to offer the services required at approximately 
the same price and quality. So the problem is the basic decision on the question 
of procurement, not the choice of a specific contract partner. 
Since there is no detailed system of accounting, there are no exact figures on 
the production costs of the public subway security service. In particular, the 
costs of administrating and maintaining the necessary equipment (vehicles, 
uniforms, weapons, etc.) cannot be defined precisely. Therefore, a mere com- 
parison of production costs does not offer suricient evidence of which alterna- 
tive should be chosen. Additionally, the local politicians hesitate to dismiss 250 
public employees. Those who are "Beamte" can not even be dismissed legally. 
Nevertheless there is evidence that the present organization of the subway 
security might not be the most efficient one. 
The decision process could be structured into 13 steps: 47 
1. Preparing the actual project, the members of the team must be selected. 
It is crucial that the team should comprise not only representatives of the 
interest groups concerned, but also some external experts, who are able to 
moderate the process of decision-making from a "neutral" point of view. A 
schedule and fixed deadlines must be given to the team. In addition, the tasks 
which must be analyzed must be pointed out as precisely as possible. In the case 
of our example, activities such as the maintenance of vehicles or the cleaning 
of uniforms would have to be considered separately. 
43 See OECD [1993,25-371. 
44 See PICOT [l991 b]. 
45 See WOMACK, JONES and Roos [1991]. 
46 For a more detailed analysis and further examples refer to PICOT and WOLFF [1992]. 
47 See also PICOT [l991 b] and GERHARDT, NIPPA and PICOT 119921. 
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Note: It is of great importance that the procedure is transparent to all 
individuals concerned. Often, there is a broad consensus about the existence of 
problems. This consensus has to be maintained during the process of decision- 
making in order to secure a broad acceptance of the solution. There must be 
a permanent access to information for everybody who feels concerned. In 
addition, it is even useful to disseminate information on the project outside of 
the team, because employees, for instance, might offer valuable suggestions 
from their own experience. 
2. The team then has to examine the environment, the institutional frame- 
work, and the external factors which influence the accomplishment of the tasks. 
This means that the present form of procurement and possible alternatives have 
to be pointed out. 
3. On the basis of this information, a questionnaire must be formulated. The 
objective of the questionnaire is to structure information according to the 
characteristics of the activities which are to be reorganized. Subsequently, the 
persons to be interviewed can be selected and contacted for appointments. 
3. Information on the tasks and all the individual activities which are part 
of them must be systematiealIy collected by using the questionnaire. 
5. This information must be summarized and evaluated. 
6. Subsequently, a concept for reorganization can be developed. 
7. The concept has to describe and explain the general strategical perspective 
"make" or "buy" according to the method which is described in section 2.1. 
8. In most cases, there will be no "pure" make-or-by-decision. Instead, there 
will typically be a recommendation to cooperate with private suppliers. In our 
example, the recommendation might be a cooperation with one or two of the 
private security companies. 
9 For each separate activity to be reorganized, the degree of vertical integra- 
tion must be specified and a recommendation for a contractual agree- 
ment developed, e.g.: long-term contracts with private suppliers, "public" 
shares in important suppliers, or close cooperation with other authorities, such 
as the police. Here, the principles from section 2.2 and 2.3 have to be consid- 
ered. 
10. The differences between the recommended and the actual form of orga- 
nization must be pointed out. 
11. The reasons for those differences must be identified, analyzed and ex- 
plained to the employees and the public. 
12. Necessary corrections of the organizational patterns can be implemented. 
13. The project can be officially completed. 
Often the implementation of organizational changes cannot be achieved within 
short periods of time, especially if the acquisition of new staff or the dismissal 
of employees is necessary. Yet there is a high degree of acceptance of the 
recommendations which result from a transparent and a participative method 
of this kind. Orgunizatiotzul chaizges canizot successjully be itnpleinented without 
all parties concerned being convinced that these changes are indeed beneficial. 
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4.  Organizing the "Public" Sector With "Private" Means 
Our aim in this essay has been to transfer complex economic ideas into some 
coherent guidelines which can be easily understood and applied by practi- 
tioners. The first practical projects in the public sector which have been ana- 
lyzed according to this concept are showing rather encouraging results.48 
The idea of applying neo-institutional theory to problems of the public sector 
is by no means new. But in Germany, there is a lack of planned and sytematic 
organization in many public firms and administrations. Often, there is a lack 
of economic know-how in public organizations, because the traditional educa- 
tion of the "Beamten" is still more law- than management-oriented. In addi- 
- tion, there is a strong, traditional rejection of a general adoption OF private 
management methods. In many cases, this seems, at first sight, to be justified 
because the legal framework of public firms and administrations is quite differ- 
ent from that of private enterprises. Yet, neo-institutional analysis reminds us 
of the fact that institutions should be shaped in order to meet well-defined 
demands - not vice versa. This has been neglected in German public firms and 
administration for too long. 
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Comment 
by 
DAVID B. AUDRETSCH 
In his keynote address to last year's meeting of the American Economic Asso- 
ciation, dedicated to an institutionalist of an earlier generation, Richard T. Ely, 
and published as the Richard T. Ely Lecture in the most recently published issue 
of the American Economic Review, Professor Arnold HARBERGER [1993, 31 
makes a plea that the field of economics should be more oriented towards 
practitioners. He argues that our profession should take a lesson from the 
medical profession, where, ". . . the textbooks, treatises, and journal articles 
written by medical scientists display more understanding of the situation of the 
practitioners and end up being more relevant to the specific decisions they have 
to take than do our corresponding writings." 
I think that Harberger would approve of Professor PICOT'S and Ms. WOLFF'S 
[l9941 effort here today, because they take a branch of economic theory - 
neo-institutional theory - and turn it into a tool of considerable use and 
practicality for the practitioner. The question they address - "How should 
public firms be organized and structured in order to maximize efficiency?" is 
answered through the lens of three branches of neo-institutional theory - the 
analysis of transaction costs versus market exchange, the assignment of prop- 
erty rights in such a manner as to maximize the efficient allocation and use of 
resources, and agency problems arising from risk aversion and asymmetric 
information across individual agents. What the authors produce is a blueprint 
for structuring and organizing public agencies that not only pleases the 
economist, because of its well founded and sensible economic rationale, but 
also the practitioner, because of its feasibility and ease of implementation. 
Indeed, Arnold Harberger would be pleased. 
Still, the blueprint provided by Professor 'picot and Ms. Wolff may not yet 
be ready to be sent off to Bonn. For example, they recommend that only certain 
government workers be granted a Beamte status - a position of privilege in 
terms of job security and pension benefits, but aIso greater responsibility in 
terms of loyalty and commitment to the employer, in this case the state. They 
argue that only those workers engaged in tasks which are both highly specific 
and strategicaly important to the state be granted such a priviledged status. As 
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they point out: why provide, say a gardner, cook, or auto mechanic, or subway 
security guards this extra benefit without demanding anything extra from them 
in return. The solution, they suggest, is to restrict this status to, say, only the 
handful of people who would in turn subcontract the actual service - say 
providing protection in the subway -without having to resort to a proliferation 
of the Beamte status to all those individuals actually providing the service. 
I find this argument sensible and compelling - as long as there are no 
externalities across individuals. That is, as long as the attitude of each worker 
in terms of dedication, loyalty, etc., does not spill over to other workers. But 
what if it does? Which is to say there may be a hidden gain in providing 
non-specific and non-strategic workers the same status - the Beamte status - 
because of their impact on such workers through externalities. 
The Japanese system revolves around minimizing differences in status across 
individuals rather than accentuating them (AUDRETSCH [1989]). The emphasis 
is on homogeneity and harmony and equality of status, because apparently the 
externality of one worker's attitudes on his co-workers is embedded into the 
entire organization of work. The importance of externalities may be magnified 
when confronted by organizational change. The authors conclusion that, "Or- 
ganizational changes cannot successfully be implemented without all parties 
concerned being convinced that they are indeed beneficial," could be interpret- 
ed as predicting that organizations where the agents feel they have, in terms of 
that famous concept introduced by Albert 0. H r r c s c ~ h ~ ~  [1970], "Voice," will 
be more accepting of change than those agents who are more prone to fear 
"Exit." Perhaps this is why Japanese firms have proven to be generally more 
flexible than their European and especially their American counterparts - 
Japanese workers have apparently a greater propensity not only to accept but 
even to create organizational change (AUDRETSCH [1989]). 
Professor Picot and Ms. Wolff look at the glass of German public firms and 
find it half empty. But from my American perspective, I see a glass that is 
half full. Americans, and especially conservative Americans, seem to assume 
that public firms cannot be administered in any way that makes them attractive. 
By contrast, Germans, and especially conservative Germans, recognize that 
properly administered public German firms make an invaluable contribution to 
the economic and social welfare. So, when Professor Picot and Ms. Wolff 
conclude that there is a lack of "planful and systematic organization in many 
public firms and administrations . . . because the traditlonal education of 
'Beamten' is still rather law-biased," I wonder whether this weakness is not 
really a hidden strength - to internalize the externalities in attitudes across 
workers. 
References 
AUDRETSCH, D. B. [1989], The Ahrket nttd the State: Government Policies Torvnrds Brcsi- 
ness it2 Europe, Japui~ and the [J.S., New York University Press: New York. 
150/1 (1994) Public Firms and Administrations 235 
HARBERGER, A. C. 119931, "The Search for Relevance in Economics," American Econorn- 
ic Review, 83(2), 1 - 16. 
HIRSCHMAN, A. 0. [l 9791, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Harvard University Press: Cam- 
bridge, MA. 
PICOT, A. and WOLFT, B. [1994], "Institutional Economics of Public Firms and Admin- 
istrations - Some Guidelines for Efficiency-Oriented Design," Jourital of Znstitution- 
nl and Theoretical Economics, 150, 21 1-232. 
Professor David B. Audretscit 
CEPR and Wissenschaftszentrtlnz Berlin 
fcr Sozialforscltuizg 
Reicltpietscltufer 50 
10785 Berlin 
Germany 
Journal of Institutional and Tl~eoretical Economics (JITE) 150/1 (1994), 236-238 
Zeitschrift fiir die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 
Institutional Economics of Public Firms 
and Administrations 
The recent movement away from government supply to private supply of 
certain goods and services is, in my view, the first small break in the dike of 
growlng government control over the use of society's resources. In the unlikely 
event that the privatization trend continues, the natural question arises as to 
where it should stop. Is there a minimal subset of activities that can only be 
supplied by government? If so what is the set and how can we insure that the 
natural monopoly of government will not be used to collect rents for govern- 
ment? 
PICOT and WQLFF [l9941 address both of these issues as they relate to the 
current situation in Germany. They use the recent contributions to economics 
in the area of transaction costs, property rights and agency problems to answer 
both questions. Picot and Wolff argue that input specificity and strategic im- 
portance can form a foundation for defining the set of' goods where government 
has a natural monopoly. Their argument is consistent with the theory that if 
long lived highly specialized inputs are to be supplied, then investors must be 
assured that after their investment opportunistic demanders will not renege on 
agreements concerning returns. As is well known, such conditions in the private 
sector often Iead to vertical arrangements to guarantee that opportunistic 
behavior will not occur. 
I must say, however, that input specificity does not imply that government 
is required. Private arrangements dealing with input specificity are common- 
place. Further, strategic importance is also not sufficient to require govern- 
ment. The production and design of military hardware and the long history of 
mercenary armies are samples of high input specificity and strategic importance 
that have a long standing history of being supplied by the private sector. In fact, 
the "norms" of behavior of mercenaries and weapons manufacturers replace 
the so-called "ioyalty" that Picot and Wolff seem to imply that government 
work requires. 
After arguing that there is a proper subset of all activity that must be supplied 
by government, the authors set out to show us why government might supply 
them inefficiently. Here is where the principles of transaction costs, private 
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property and agency problems rear their head. Picot and Wolff argue that 
government agencies are inefficient and suggest ways to change this fact of life. 
They argue that a realignment of the public sector can make it behave as if it 
were a private sector so that for any given outcome, the input cost is minimized. 
Once a determination is made as to the minimal set of activities that are most 
efficiently left to government two questions must be answered. First, what do 
we want from public enterprise? Second, how can our public enterprise goal be 
achieved? 
What do we Want From Public Enterprise? 
Ideally, a public enterprise would yield results similar to competitive equilibri- 
um. Specifically, such an enterprise would result in output being set where the 
marginal rate of substitution in consumption between government produced 
goods and privately produced goods was equal to the marginal rate of substi- 
tution in production between these same two sets of goods. Additionally, no 
good or service that if produced by the government would enhance welfare, is 
not produced. Finally, each government produced good is produced until the 
marginal social value equals the marginal social cost. 
How can This Goal be Achieved? 
Picot and Wolff argue that because of the nature of public goods, property 
rights given to operators cannot be transferable which results in the classic 
problem of operators of government enterprises under-investing in both human 
and non-human capital (under-capitalization). Because of the long-term con- 
tract between the public sector (agents) and the citizens (principals) we are 
exposed to adverse selection (people who select government jobs have a produc- 
tivity to play the government game) and moral hazard (once in the game, the 
participants behave opportunistically). Picot and Wolff argue further that the 
separation of principals and agents makes it difficult for principals to monitor 
agents. 
In order to solve these problems, the authors argue that we must change the 
public accounting system and shorten the contract length. The changes they 
suggest can be summarized in a simple rule. The efficiency of government 
enterprises can be improved by reducing the cost of the principals monitoring 
the enterprises. While information cost is important, given the incentives of the .' 
public (principals) to use the information generated, it is possible to make the 
cost low enough to warrent the average citizen's time in accessing information. 
There is no doubt that interest groups will use this information and perhaps less 
expensive information will lead to more interest groups and a form of compe- 
tition among interest groups. Even if we make the information concerning the 
government enterprises easier to obtain, the generators of the information (the 
agents) have incentives to doctor the information. The history of the U.S. in this 
regard does not make me sanguine about the outcome. 
Conclusion 
If we want efficiency, we cannot depend on the principals monitoring the agents. 
The principals (citizens) are affected very little by any given government pro- 
gram and do not have the time to monitor these programs. The agents (govern- 
ment employees who run the program) will behave opportunistically. What 
Picot and Wolff suggest is the implementation of a set of rules that make the 
monitoring of agencies less costly so that more principals will have the incentive 
to monitor their agents. I applauded the analysis of publicly supplied goods and 
services undertaken by Picot and Wolff. They get to the nub of the problem and 
suggest solutions that move us toward an incentive compatible monitoring of 
government agencies by the citizens. However, because of the tremendous gulf 
between the costs of monitoring and the incentives to monitor, I do not expect 
that any of these reforms will be effective in reducing the size of government. 
C)n a more fundamental level the question is, do we want to make govern- 
ment more efficient? If one could be guaranteed that increasing efficiency in 
government enterprises would result in the resources previously used by gov- 
ernment being restored to private hands, then I think the answer is obvious. The 
history of government, however, does not give one confidence that such a 
repatriation of resources is likely to take place. Most likely, the released re- 
sources would be placed in other government programs that would result in 
further government imposed resource misallocation in the private sector. 
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